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Universal Health Insurance Coverage 
Through a Single Public Payer
Andrew J. Hogan 
John H. Goddeeris
Michigan State University
Support for a universal health insurance through a single payer grew 
in the United States during the 1980s (Blendon 1991), especially among 
public health professionals and labor unions. Recently a number of large 
corporations have expressed support for the "Canadian Model" of 
universal health insurance, largely out of their frustration with private 
efforts to control health care costs (Califano 1989). The two principal 
motivations for interest in a Canadian-style universal health insurance 
plan are: (1) to provide access to basic health services as a right of all 
citizens; and (2) to control health care costs.
This chapter will focus primarily on the first issue of providing ac 
cess to basic health services for all citizens. The implications of a single- 
payer public health insurance program for cost containment will be 
discussed, though not in great detail. It should be noted that the Cana 
dian health insurance system was not designed principally to bring about 
health care cost containment (Evans 1988), and that the claim that Canada 
has been significantly more successful than the United States in restrain 
ing health expenditure growth has been called into question (Neuschler 
1990, pp. 37-46; Goodman and Musgrave 1991, pp. 2-9; for a pro- 
Canadian view, see Barer, Welch and Antioch 1991). There is no doubt 
that Canada spends much less on health care than the United States by 
any measure, or that since the full implementation of universal coverage 
in the early 1970s health care spending as a share of GNP has grown 
more slowly there. But this latter result is to some degree due to slower 
GNP growth in the United States. In per capita terms, real personal 
health expenditures have grown at about the same rate in the two
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countries during the time that Canada has had universal coverage. Fur 
ther, Canada enjoys the luxury of using the U.S. health care system 
as a safety valve when demand exceeds planned capacity.
The U.S. health system is highly decentralized and consumer-driven. 
For those who can afford health insurance, the system provides very 
easy access to the latest technology in settings with excellent amenities. 
While the U.S. health system may not appear rational from a public 
health perspective, it is highly responsive to the needs of privately in 
sured consumers.
The U.S. health system is clearly undergoing financial distress. 
Because of the system's decentralized, consumer-driven nature and 
because poverty, illness, and lack of health insurance tend to cluster 
in the same population groups, this financial distress is manifested in 
an increasingly noncompetitive performance in achieving public health 
objectives compared to other industrialized nations (Bodenheimer 1989, 
p. 10). Although the causes are undoubtedly complex and go beyond 
the reach of medical care alone, much of the poor public health perfor 
mance can be attributed to the lack of ready access by one-quarter to 
one-third of the population to routine preventive health services and 
primary medical care. This lack of access is due largely to a lack of 
personal financial resources, expressed most often as a lack of adequate 
health insurance coverage (Pepper Commission 1990, pp. 33-35). In 
cluded in this subpopulation are those covered by Medicaid, which in 
most states pays providers such low rates that recipients frequently en 
counter difficulty in finding providers who will accept them, particularly 
in specialties like obstetrics (Pepper Commission 1990, pp. 30-31). 
Growth in the number of uninsured results from reduced health insurance 
coverage rates by both private employers and by Medicaid (Piacentini 
and Cerino 1990, pp. 246, 352).
Reductions in insurance coverage for the working poor may be a 
reflection of the fact that their real incomes have not increased while 
health care costs have soared (Piacentini and Cerino 1990; Peterson 
1991). The working poor may have accepted a lack of health insurance 
in preference to further wage cuts. And as both the willingness and ability 
of many working class households to increase tax contributions waned
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during the 1980s, funding of public health insurance programs 
(Medicaid, Medicare, Veterans Administration) has not kept pace with 
increases in health care costs or with the growth of the poverty and 
near-poverty populations. The combination of large numbers of unin 
sured and underfunded public programs has shifted much of the burden 
for the sizable real growth in personal health expenditures onto private 
insurers and self-insured employers and union trusts. Consequently, 
employers and workers have experienced disproportionately large in 
creases in health care costs (Levit and Cowan 1990). This has, in turn, 
engendered risk-avoidance maneuvering in the private insurance market, 
especially the market for individual and small business policies. These 
markets constantly churn as insurers and insureds attempt to shift risk 
onto each other, illustrating some of the classic symptoms of insurance 
market failure described by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
Thus, while we may be skeptical that a single-payer universal health 
insurance plan could by itself retard the growth of health care costs due 
to population aging, technological change, or the deeply held predilec 
tion of the American public for medical miracles, such a plan could 
reduce the administrative and transaction costs associated with the cur 
rent health insurance market and could provide a mechanism through 
which public health goals could be given some ascendancy over in 
dividual medical consumerism. It goes without saying that a universal 
health insurance plan would alleviate problems of access to basic health 
care that arise from the lack of financial resources at the household level.
This chapter briefly discusses the implications for health care costs 
of a state-initiated program of universal coverage. There are many open 
questions here, but it is not realistic to expect such a program to substan 
tially slow the growth of costs in the near future. The heart of the analysis 
considers the likely redistributional effects of a move to universal 
coverage, including illustrative quantitative estimates for Michigan. A 
Canadian-style system is likely to redistribute income toward the cur 
rently uninsured poor and away from those in the upper tail of the in 
come distribution. When initiated by a single state, it would also risk 
losing significant subsidies built into the federal tax system. Even a state 
plan providing only basic coverage and financed in a way that retains 
federal subsidies would have important redistributional effects.
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Universal Health Coverage and Health Care Costs
Comparisons with Canada and other countries around the world have 
raised hopes in the United States that a state system of universal coverage 
could improve public health outcomes while actually reducing the 
total cost of health care. There are three main arguments for this view:
(1) a single-payer system would substantially reduce administrative costs;
(2) a single payer could exert greater control over fees for services and 
impose a more rational pattern of investment in capital and equipment 
on the industry; and (3) universal coverage would lead to a more effi 
cient utilization of services by the currently uninsured that would reduce 
the total cost of their health care. With regard to the last point, it is 
tempting to think that better coverage for the uninsured would lead to 
healthier lifestyles, greater use of preventive care, and earlier treatment 
when acute problems arise, and that all of these things would translate 
into lower, not higher, total health care costs. The available evidence 
indicates, however, that the uninsured use less care than those who are 
insured and have similar characteristics (Long and Rodgers 1990). The 
natural inference is that improving their access to care will, on net, in 
crease their consumption.
While each of these arguments for the cost-saving potential of universal 
coverage is important and merits continued research, it is unlikely that 
a move to such a system in the United States would reduce the growth 
of health care spending in the near term, particularly if enacted by a 
single state rather than the national government. Let us consider 
arguments (1) and (2) in somewhat more detail, focusing particularly 
on how they apply to a state-initiated system.
Administrative Costs
One appealing argument for a system of universal coverage is the 
potential for enormous savings in administrative costs. It has been sug 
gested that more than half of the difference in per capita costs between 
the American and Canadian health care systems may be accounted for 
by higher administrative cost in the United States (Evans et al. 1989; 
Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1986). A single public payer has no need 
to incur many of the costs that competing private insurance plans must
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bear. These include all of the costs of marketing, of screening poten 
tial enrollees in order to set appropriate premiums, of determining ap 
propriate differentials in premiums for different risk classes of enrollees, 
of determining eligibility when claims are paid, of coordination of 
benefits when members of the same household are covered by more 
than one plan, as well as the additional costs arising when individuals 
change their coverage. Even the collection of premiums is likely to be 
much less costly when carried out as part of a state tax system already 
in place than when spread across many competing insurance firms.
More important are the additional costs related to administration of 
the health care system incurred by health care providers and consumers. 
Doctors and hospitals bear a heavy burden of administrative cost in deal 
ing with large numbers of different insurers, in determining the eligibility 
of patients, and in direct billing and collections. Consumers and their 
employers incur costs associated with comparison of plans in making 
decisions about which to choose. The considerable resources devoted 
in the current system to the zero-sum game of cost-shifting would 
presumably be saved in a universal system.
It is important to understand, however, that Canada's system has a 
number of features that contribute to its very low level of administrative 
cost, and that elimination of any of these features would correspondingly 
reduce administrative cost savings. The Canadian system provides the 
same coverage to everyone in a province through a single payer, with 
minimal cost-sharing by patients, no balance-billing by providers, and 
no supplemental private insurance coverage for services covered under 
the public system.
With the federally funded Medicare program already in place and 
providing health coverage to the elderly and disabled in the United States, 
it is unlikely that a state would want to displace that coverage and lose 
federal funds. Thus, at least Medicare (and other federal health care 
programs through the Department of Defense and Veterans Administra 
tion) would remain in place, as would private insurance coverage sup 
plemental to Medicare, unless it is included as part of the state pro 
gram. If individuals are to be allowed a choice among competing plans, 
or if the universal plan provides only basic coverage that may be sup 
plemented privately, or if consumer cost-sharing is relied upon (as a way
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to limit use of services or to reduce the central plan's share of cost), 
administrative cost savings would fall considerably.
Administrative costs are also lower in Canada because less attempt 
is made in that system to track the costs of individual patients or to 
monitor the appropriateness of care (Neuschler 1990). Unless these ef 
forts are abandoned in the United States (which seems unlikely even 
if a system of universal coverage is adopted), they will remain a source 
of greater administrative overhead. Finally, it should be understood that 
to realize administrative savings would require the elimination of ex 
isting jobs in the health insurance industry and elsewhere in the health 
care system. Canada and other countries have never had the enormous 
commitment of resources to health insurance administration that the 
United States has, and thus did not face the problem of scaling it back.
Fees, Budgets, and a Single Payer
Undoubtedly, some of Canada's success in keeping health care costs 
below those in the U.S. derives from the ability of a single payer to 
control physicians' fees and hospital budgets. These are determined by 
a process of negotiation involving medical societies, provincial hospital 
associations, and departments of health (and ultimately the provincial 
legislatures). In contrast to the very decentralized and open-ended U.S. 
system, this process does place limits on total health spending, but it 
does so in a rather unsophisticated way. There is no guarantee that the 
total level of spending is in any sense socially optimal, or even that 
the limited resources going to health care are used in the most efficient 
way possible.
How well the Canadian system of budgeting would work in the United 
States, and particularly for a single state on its own, is an open ques 
tion. As Victor Fuchs (1986) has emphasized, total health care expen 
ditures may be viewed as the product of costs per service and volume 
of services, and both elements must be controlled to contain expenditure 
growth over the long run. With regard to physicians' services, Canada 
has had less success limiting volume of services than controlling fees. 
Total hospital budgets are set, but as a result some health services are 
apparently not as readily available to middle-income and upper-income
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Canadians as to their U.S. counterparts (Goodman and Musgrave 1991, 
pp. 17-18; Rublee 1991).
It is often said that U.S. consumers will not tolerate the waiting or 
denial of services which the Canadians are said to have learned to ac 
cept. If that is so, the potential for constraining the use of medical ser 
vices through a single payer may be limited. A single state would also 
have much less monopoly power in dealing with physicians than would 
the U.S. government or even a Canadian province. Physicians' fees 
(or, more important, physicians' total incomes) could not be kept far 
below those in other states without prompting extensive out-migration 
of doctors and consequent access problems due to physician shortages.
Political Concerns
Whether resources devoted to health care would increase or decrease 
in the aggregate with the establishment of state-financed universal 
coverage depends to a great extent on the political willingness to con 
strain costs. Under any reasonable cost-containment scenario, it seems 
certain that the distribution of resources would be greatly affected. The 
current U.S. health care system is oriented to satisfying the demands 
of the privately insured employee or retiree, with the needs of public- 
pay-only patients being met for the most part as either volume filler 
or as part of a social mission. Under a single-payer system, all patients 
provide an equal opportunity for financial gain or loss. Barring large 
copayments which the poor would be unable to pay, some resources 
now devoted to serving the privately insured would shift toward popula 
tion groups that are currently underserved. This would be especially 
true if the universal health insurance plan prohibits private rivals or 
supplements, as is the case in Canada. If the benefit plan is reasonably 
comprehensive with minimal copayments and if private health insurance 
for services covered in the national health plan is prohibited, then a 
significant redistribution of resources would likely take place. If the 
national health plan resembles the U.S. Medicare program, where 
Medicare-only coverage is tantamount to being underinsured and where 
most middle-income and upper-income retirees have supplemental 
private insurance, then the redistribution would be considerably 
moderated.
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If cost containment were a sustainable political goal in a universal 
health plan, then we could expect those who are now well-insured to 
see a reduction in their real coverage (access to services on demand) 
over time. Depending on the financing mechanism used, that same group 
of upper-middle and upper-income voters is likely to be asked to bear 
a larger share of the cost than it currently does. The political feasibility 
of simultaneously reducing coverage and increasing the cost burden for 
a large block of relatively affluent voters seems dubious and casts doubt 
on the potential of a state-initiated universal health care system to truly 
contain costs.
Given the fate of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage legislation with 
its redistributional premium structure, the political feasibility of a single- 
payer universal health plan which also truly constrains the normal growth 
in personal health expenditures is doubtful. 1
Distributional Effects of Universal Coverage 
An Illustration Using Michigan Data
Any universal health care plan implemented by a state may create 
major changes in the distribution of health care use and in how the costs 
are borne. In this section we analyze the distributional effects of two 
illustrative approaches to universal health care, using data from 
Michigan. Our analysis requires us to make a number of assumptions, 
which could be tested more carefully against empirical data. More study 
is clearly desirable before implementation of any plan. At least some 
of the patterns we identify are strong enough, however, that we doubt 
that they would be substantially altered in a more comprehensive study.
The two approaches to universal coverage we consider are: (1) a 
Canadian-style system, with a single public payer supported by income 
taxes, excluding all forms of private coverage, and with minimal 
copayments; and (2) a mixed public-private option in which there is 
limited universal coverage similar to that provided in the current U.S. 
Medicare program, with possible private supplementary insurance. Both 
approaches exclude populations currently receiving health care coverage 
through federal programs (Medicare, the Departments of Defense and 
Veterans Affairs). Our rationale is that a state would not want to forgo
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federal funding and would therefore expect such individuals to retain 
their current coverage.
Our main focus is on the distributional implications of alternative 
financing mechanisms, and we downplay other possible effects of a 
system of universal coverage. We do assume some increase in utiliza 
tion of care for the currently uninsured, but no effects for others. Costs 
per unit of care are treated as the same under all options, and no ad 
ministrative savings are incorporated. Proponents of universal coverage 
may perceive this as biased against their view, but we consider the cost- 
containment potential of a universal system to be sufficiently uncertain 
that our assumptions are a reasonable baseline.
The Current System
To provide a background for the analysis, we begin by describing 
the distributional impacts of the current system in Michigan. Data on 
population, income, and insurance coverage are taken from the 1988 
Current Population Survey and its supplement on health insurance. These 
data refer to conditions in 1987. We divide the population into family 
"insurance units" 2 and array the families by income as a percent of 
the federal poverty standard. Income is gross money income before taxes 
and including transfer payments. It does not include the value of fringe 
benefits, such as employer-provided health insurance. For the value of 
health care utilized we use 1987 national per capita personal health care 
expenditures (Piacentini and Cerino 1990, p. 160) of $1,726. This per 
capita expenditure is adjusted by a factor of 1.2142 for adults or 0.7041 
for children, reflecting relative per capita expenditures in the Michigan 
Medicaid Program for its Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
population. We adjusted health expenditures by uninsured households 
to 42 percent of the level of insured households based on data from the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (Long and Rodgers 1990; 
CBO 1991). We also identify as "underinsured" those whose family 
income was less than 200 percent of the poverty standard and who pur 
chased nongroup health insurance or a group plan for which no employer 
made a contribution. Our expectation is that insurance coverage is usually 
quite limited in these cases. We treat consumption of the underinsured
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as midway between the uninsured and the insured. Lacking sufficient 
data to do otherwise, we make the simplifying assumptions that medical 
care use among the other insured does not vary with the type (public 
vs. private) or comprehensiveness of coverage. In reality, private 
coverage tends to be less extensive for those at lower incomes and this 
probably restrains their utilization relative to those with more complete 
coverage.
In Figure 1 we summarize how the use of health care and the burden 
of paying for it are currently spread across income classes in Michigan. 
The bottom (negative) half of the figure depicts health care use. The 
height of the bar for each income group reflects the amount of health 
care utilized by the income group, which is determined by the size of 
the population in the group, the percent who are children, and the per 
cent who are uninsured. We have distinguished public and private utiliza 
tion. Public utilization is care paid by the Medicaid program. Not sur 
prisingly, it is concentrated at the low end of the income distribution. 
It may be more surprising that even in the group below the poverty 
line, less than half of care used is provided by Medicaid.
The top (positive) half of Figure 1 shows how much health care is 
paid for in each income group. A group may not pay for all the care 
it uses because some is publicly financed, and some is "uncompensated." 
We mean by uncompensated any excess in the cost of providing care 
over the direct payments made by the recipient or any third party. In 
our analysis uncompensated care is generated by Medicaid, which is 
assumed to reimburse for only 75 percent of the cost of care for its 
beneficiaries, and by the uninsured and underinsured. Of course, it is 
possible that some groups pay for more care than they use, if they pay 
taxes to support Medicaid or if costs of uncompensated care are shifted 
to them. Some costs of care are also shifted to out-of-state taxpayers 
through federal tax subsidies.
In allocating the cost of care, we attribute to each family:
Out-of-Pocket Costs: Out-of-pocket costs were calculated for all 
as 18 percent of the value of total health care utilized, based on 
data from the national health accounts (Levit and Cowan 1990). 
It is likely that this percentage varies with insurance coverage and
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Figure 1
1987 Michigan Health Use and Payments 
by Income Class and Payment Source
Excludes Medicare, CHAMPUS, Military Health
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income, so that this is an area where better data could improve 
the precision of the estimates. The remaining care used by the un 
insured is uncompensated. For the underinsured, we assume that 
half of care is covered by insurance, and the remainder after out- 
of-pocket payments is uncompensated. The broad income group 
ings that we use also mask the fact that out-of-pocket payments 
are highly variable within these groups (particularly for the un 
insured), depending on the need for care.
Net Private Insurance: This is the cost of its private health in 
surance, excluding any amount of subsidy through the tax system. 
Even if insurance is employer-provided, we treat it as though it 
substitutes for higher wages, so that its cost is borne by the 
employee. This assumption is standard in the health economics 
literature, and is discussed in chapter 8 of this volume. For an 
insured family, the gross cost of health insurance is taken to be 
the value of health care used but not paid for out-of-pocket (half 
the value of health care used for the underinsured), plus an im 
putation for the cost of uncompensated care. In effect we assume 
that if there were no uncompensated care, insurance premiums 
in the aggregate would be lower by the current cost of that care. 
To deal with the tax subsidy, we compute the taxes an employee 
would have paid on the gross value of employer-provided health 
insurance if it were treated as taxable income. This includes all 
PICA3 taxes, and state and federal income taxes. Tax subsidies 
for health insurance and health services are calculated based on 
the family's 1987 marginal tax rate: 14.3 percent PICA (for earn 
ings under $43,000), 0 - 38.5 percent federal income tax, 4 4.6 
percent state income tax. The marginal rate appropriate to the fami 
ly's taxable income and earnings was multiplied by the value of 
the family's private health insurance coverage to produce a tax 
subsidy. 5 The net cost of health insurance is the value of the 
premium minus the reduction in taxes that results from taking com 
pensation in this form rather than as taxable wages.
Tax Support: Medicaid is tax-supported, with state and federal 
dollars. The costs of tax subsidies for health insurance are also
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borne by taxpayers. State Medicaid dollars and state tax subsidies 
must be paid by Michigan taxpayers, so these costs must be 
distributed back to Michigan households. State contributions to 
the Medicaid program and the costs of financing state income tax 
subsidies for employer-sponsored health insurance were allocated 
equally to the state sales tax (assumed to be proportioned to total 
family income) and the state income tax, based on state taxable 
family income. Federal contributions to the Medicaid program were 
raised from federal taxable family income at the average marginal 
rate of 20 percent. The costs of federal spending and tax subsidies, 
however, are borne by taxpayers throughout the United States. 
We attribute the federal share of Medicaid to Michigan taxpayers, 
but treat the federal tax subsidies as shifted to out-of-state 
taxpayers. 6
Out-of-pocket costs, net private insurance, and tax support corres 
pond to the first three segments of the top bars in Figure 1. The last 
segment allocates by income class the federal tax subsidy for employer- 
provided health insurance. We regard the burden of the subsidy as be 
ing borne by out-of-state taxpayers.
Figure 1 shows that the value of health care utilized exceeds the amount 
paid for at all levels of income. Federal tax subsidies make this possi 
ble. The subsidies are unimportant for low-income households, but the 
poor receive more care than they pay for because of Medicaid coverage 
and uncompensated care. Higher-income taxpayers must support this 
care for the poor, but what they pay is not as large as the federal sub 
sidies they receive for their own care. The current system is progressive 
in the sense that the ratio of payments to health care use rises somewhat 
with income.
Figure 2 breaks apart the components of tax support in Figure 1 and 
allows us to look more closely at Michigan's subsidies to health care 
and financing of Medicaid. Subsidies through the state income tax system 
must be borne by state taxpayers. Figure 2 shows that these have relative 
ly little redistributive effect across income classes, because those who 
receive the subsidies to a large degree also pay to refinance them.
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Figure 2
Tax Support for Personal Health Care 
Michigan 1987
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Among families at the same income, the subsidies do favor those with 
employer-provided health insurance over others. Not surprisingly, tax 
support for Medicaid comes heavily from households with relatively 
high incomes.
The Canadian Model
In analyzing a Canadian-style state health plan, we assume that the 
state is able to retain current federal Medicaid dollars, but that the re 
maining health care utilization is financed entirely through a nearly 
threefold increase in the state's flat rate income tax. Health care utiliza 
tion (displayed in the bottom half of Figure 3) changes from the cur 
rent system only for those currently uninsured or underinsured. Health 
care use increases for the uninsured to the level of the rest of the popula 
tion, more than doubling their medical care consumption. Even this in 
crease in use may understate the benefit of the state plan to the unin 
sured, as the state plan ends their dependence on uncompensated care, 
the availability of which is always uncertain and for which quality may be 
low. In modeling the current system, the underinsured had been treated 
as consuming medical care at a level half way between the uninsured 
and the insured. Health care use by the underinsured is therefore also 
assumed to increase somewhat under the state health plan. In all, these 
changes represent a 15 percent increase in total health care utilization.
The top bars in Figure 3 show the distribution of the costs of care 
under this plan. The Canadian-style plan eliminates health insurance 
as an employee benefit, and we assume that for those with employer- 
provided coverage wages rise by the employer cost of that coverage 
(this is implied by the assumption that the cost of health insurance is 
borne by the worker). However, families now bear a cost through the 
taxes they pay to finance the state health plan. The bars are divided 
into three segments. The first is labeled "Current Taxes" and reflects 
taxes that support the current Medicaid program. We allocate these to 
income classes exactly as we did for the current system. The second 
segment shows new state income taxes needed, allocated to taxpayers 
in each income class.
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Figure 3
Health Expenditures and Income Taxes 
Canadian-Style Public Health Insurance
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From a state's perspective, a major drawback to an income tax- 
financed universal health plan is the increase in federal tax liabilities 
for state residents, as the federal subsidies to employer-provided coverage 
are forgone. Not all federal subsidies would be lost, however. For those 
who itemize deductions on their federal returns, higher state taxes are 
deductible from federal taxable income. In effect, the federal treasury 
bears a share of each itemizing family's state income tax, equal to the 
federal marginal tax rate.
The third segment in the top of Figure 3 indicates in each group the 
portion of higher state taxes shifted to out-of-state taxpayers via deduc- 
tibility. We calculate this by taking into account federal marginal tax 
rates and the share of taxpayers in each group who are itemizers (using 
national averages on itemizing by income in 1987, from U.S. Depart 
ment of Treasury 1989, Table 1). This segment is small enough to be 
imperceptible in the figure up to 300 percent of poverty (in the 200-300 
percent group it reaches only $48 million). 7 It grows much larger in 
the highest-income groups, even in relation to new state taxes, for two 
reasons: higher-income taxpayers face higher marginal tax rates, and 
they are much more likely to be itemizers.
Compared with the current system, the distribution of the cost is borne 
more heavily by the higher-income groups under the Canadian-style 
plan. The Michigan income tax is a flat rate tax, with a personal ex 
emption of $1,600 per member of the household. The exemptions make 
taxes paid a smaller share of income for those of the low end of the 
distribution. Because of low tax contributions and the elimination of 
out-of-pocket payments for their own care, those at the low end of the 
distribution bear a much smaller portion of the cost than they do cur 
rently. For those with incomes up to 200 percent of the poverty level, 
the ratio of contributions to health care use is significantly lower under 
the Canadian model than under the current system. The two systems 
are approximately the same between 200 and 300 percent of poverty, 
and the ratio becomes much larger for the Canadian model at higher 
incomes. The higher overall ratio for the Canadian model reflects the 
loss of federal subsidies, a point to which we will return.
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Of course, a state system providing this type of coverage does not 
have to be financed in this way, and other financing mechanisms (for 
example, income-based premiums) could have different distributional 
consequences. Any system that effectively exempts those at low incomes 
from bearing the costs of their care will, however, involve significant 
redistributions.
Limited Public Coverage With Private Supplementation
Our alternative version of universal coverage is rather different from 
the Canadian-style plan. We assume that all are guaranteed limited 
coverage along the lines of the federal Medicare program (coverage 
for hospital and physician care, with some limits and cost-sharing), which 
may then be supplemented with private coverage. Roughly in keeping 
with Medicare, we assume that the public insurance covers half of the 
cost of care for a typical household. This coverage is financed through 
a flat-rate payroll tax on the earnings of all workers, with a ceiling on 
the amount of payroll tax owed by any individual. The particular form 
of the payroll tax used in our analysis is an 8.5 percent tax on the first 
$30,000 of earnings. This combination is sufficient to raise the needed 
revenue. A higher ceiling would make it possible to reduce the rate 
somewhat.
To analyze the distribution of health care use and costs under this 
approach, we must make some additional assumptions concerning 
whether or not basic public coverage is supplemented with private in 
surance. We assume that persons currently eligible for Medicaid would 
be covered fully (basic plus supplemental coverage) through the 
state/federal Medicaid program. Anyone currently covered by private 
insurance is assumed to retain it to supplement the public program and 
cover the other half of medical costs. The supplemental private coverage 
is assumed to be of the same type as is currently held: group or in 
dividual, employer-provided or individually purchased. Those who are 
currently uninsured do not supplement, and therefore are responsible 
for half of their health care expenses out-of-pocket. Those in this group 
with incomes below 200 percent of poverty pay out-of-pocket for 18 
percent of what insurance does not cover (as we assume they do in the
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current system) and default on the remainder. Some uncompensated care 
thus remains in the system. Its cost is borne in the premiums of sup 
plemental private insurance. As for the payroll tax, it is assumed to 
be borne by workers. For those who had not been receiving a health 
benefit in 1987, this means that their earnings fall to offset the amount 
of payroll tax paid by the employer. Most of the earnings are lost to 
workers in households with incomes below 200 percent of the poverty 
standard, roughly 7 percent of the current earnings of workers without 
employer-provided health insurance.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of health care expenditures and sup 
porting state payroll taxes (8.5 percent) under a mixed public-private 
state health insurance plan. Redistribution under the mixed plan is not 
as marked as in the single-payer income tax-supported approach. 
However, a significant amount of redistribution of health resources would 
take place, and in a form similar to that of mandated benefits for all 
employers (see chapter 4 in this volume). Payroll tax financing, as pro 
posed for our second approach, has one distinct advantage over the use 
of an income tax. The payroll tax would be treated as a business ex 
pense and not part of an employee's taxable income. The practical ad 
vantage of the payroll tax approach becomes evident when it is recogniz 
ed that, without federal cooperation, the increase in federal taxes due 
to the rise in taxable income occasioned by the loss of employee health 
benefits under a Canadian-style health plan could be 10 percent of total 
personal health care costs.
Figure 5 summarizes the distributional effects of the current system 
as compared with the two versions of universal coverage we are con 
sidering. For each system and each income class it shows the ratio of net 
contributions all payments for health care, netting out subsidies and 
including taxes to use of health care. Figure 5 clearly shows that both 
versions of universal coverage would redistribute resources from the 
top of the income distribution (primarily those at more than 500 per 
cent of poverty) to those at or near the bottom. In both universal systems 
those in poverty pay very little for the care they receive, while high- 
income families pay for more than the cost of their care. The Canadian 
model, with the open-ended income tax financing we have assumed, 
is the most redistributive.
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Figure 4
Michigan Health Expenditures and Payroll Taxes 
Mixed Public-Private Health Insurance
Excludes Medicare, CHAMPUS, Military Health
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Net Private Payment = 
Private Health Insurance - 
State/Federal Tax Subsidy + 
Out-of-Pocket Expenses.
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At the right end of Figure 5 is the overall or average ratio of net con 
tributions to use for each system. It is less than 100 percent in each 
case because of federal tax subsidies. The overall ratio is the same for 
the mixed-payer model and the current system at about 75 percent, but 
the Canadian model sacrifices substantial federal subsidies and the ratio 
rises to 85 percent. Not shown in Figure 5 is an overall increase in health 
care expenditures from about $12.4 billion under the current system 
to $13.8 billion under the mixed model to $14.3 billion under the Cana 
dian system, due to the increased access to care by the uninsured and 
underinsured.
Concluding Remarks
Clearly, if a state must go-it-alone in a noncooperative federal en 
vironment, the mixed-payer system discussed here, along with the 
mandated-benefit approach discussed in chapter 4, has significant cost 
advantages. While the mixed-payer and mandated-benefit approaches 
have been identified as having weak cost-containment potential (Aaron 
1991), even the most optimistic proponents of the Canadian-style single- 
payer health plan will probably be hard pressed to argue that their plans 
can expand access and reduce costs while overcoming a 10 percent 
federal income and payroll tax surcharge. Without some cooperation 
from the federal government on recovery of additional federal income 
and PICA payroll tax revenues, state-sponsored, income tax-supported 
health plans appear to be too costly.
Even the modest level of redistribution of health resources involved 
in the mixed-payer model could make this approach infeasible in the 
current political climate (Blendon 1991). For those with incomes greater 
than five times the poverty level, the mixed-payer scenario looks 
precariously like the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage debacle, where 
wealthy Medicare beneficiaries were asked to pay actuarially unfair 
premiums to pay for increased coverage for low-income beneficiaries. 
Even though the catastrophic coverage still left the wealthy beneficiaries 
with an overall net subsidy for their full Medicare coverage, they rebelled 
and successfully forced Congress to repeal the legislation. This lesson 
will not be lost on state legislators considering either the mixed-payer 
or the single-payer model.
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Examination of the consequences of the single public payer health 
plan enacted by an individual state brings into sharp contrast the con 
tradictory health care tax and expenditure policies adopted and main 
tained by state and federal governments in the United States. At a time 
when state and federal governments have searched ever more aggressive 
ly for effective cost-containment strategies and have faced dire fiscal 
restraints leading to substantial underfunding of major public health in 
surance programs (and increasingly destabilizing cost-shifting onto 
private payers), these same units of government are providing ever more 
subsidies to middle-income and upper-income health insurance 
policyholders, effectively blunting the demand-side discipline of the 
market.
Ironically, inaction at the federal level maintains in place a federal 
tax code which is a formidable obstacle for any state wishing, through 
a Canadian-style public health insurance model, to bring its population 
face-to-face with the complete cost of health care, to be paid with highly 
distasteful income taxes. In the policy experiments reported here, a state 
government wishing to go-it-alone would almost certainly choose against 
creating an income and payroll tax windfall for an uncooperative federal 
government and would probably choose the mixed public-private payer 
model (or the mandated-benefits approach discussed in chapter 4). 
However, the mixed-payer model has the effect of increasing total health 
care tax subsidies, 8 diluting any discipline the demand side of the market 
might bring to bear on the gap between the growth of per capita in 
come and the growth of per capita health expenditures. It appears then 
that fundamental reforms may require the federal government to reassess 
the ad hoc and perhaps outdated policy implemented after World War 
II of treating employer-provided health insurance as a business expense 
and not part of taxable compensation.
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NOTES
1. Blendon (1991) provides background on American preferences for redistribute health care 
financing policies and the failure of Medicare catastrophic coverage legislation.
2. Households can contain individuals who cannot be covered under a typical family health in 
surance policy, i.e., adult children of the head of household or spouse. Households with these 
kinds of members were broken into insurance units, i.e., familial groups which could be covered 
by standard health insurance policies.
3. PICA payroll contributions are not considered by all as a tax because, in principle, social security 
benefits are linked to individual contributions. However, the pay-as-you-go financing used for 
both social security payments and Medicare means that most current contributions are spent in 
the same year they are collected and almost always before the individual contributor could make 
a claim on them. Payment of current PICA payroll taxes may create a moral obligation on a future 
generation of workers to provide an adequate level of contributions toward the retirement of the 
current cohort of workers Nonetheless, we consider the marginal PICA contributions which workers 
would make on the value of their health benefits, were they to become taxable, to be unrelated 
for all practical purposes to future social security income, i.e , we consider them to be a tax.
4. Here we calculate the federal marginal income tax rate that would apply if the household did 
not itemize deductions This overstates the marginal rate for some itemizers, but we expect this 
to be a relatively minor source of error. This analysis takes no account of the medical deduction 
on the federal income tax. That deduction can reduce the price of medical care by a percentage 
equal to a family's federal marginal tax rate, but only for those who itemize deductions, and only 
for that portion of medical expenses in excess of 7.5 percent of income The income restriction 
severely limits the use of the deduction. Nationally in 1987, only 5 percent of returns claimed 
the deduction at all, and the total amount deducted was only .6 percent of all income reported 
(U.S. Department of Treasury, 1989)
5. This treatment of tax subsidies ignores the fact that medical care is excluded from the base 
of the state's sales tax. This sales tax exclusion encourages consumption of medical care relative 
to other goods, although it is by no means the only major exclusion from the sales tax base in 
Michigan or most other states. See chapter 7 in this volume for further discussion.
6. Of course, Michigan taxpayers bear, in an analogous way, some of the costs of health care 
in all other states. But these costs cannot be controlled by state policies, and therefore are un 
changed under any of the options we consider. As we will show, a move to a state health care 
system could forfeit federal subsidies to Michigan, but Michigan taxpayers would continue to 
subsidize health care in other states.
7. The increase in the state income tax would surely induce some nonitemizers to switch to itemizing, 
so our analysis understates to some degree the share of cost shifted out-of-state.
8. While the net contribution to use ratio is the same under the mixed payer model, total use 
rises, 25 percent of which is financed by state and federal tax subsidies.
Coverage Through a Single Public Payer 75
References
Aaron, H.J. 1991. "The Worst Health Care Reform Plan .... Except for All 
the Others," Challenge 34(6): 61-63.
Barer, M., W.P. Welch and L. Antioch. 1991. "Canadian/U.S. Health Care: 
Reflections on the HIAA's Analysis," Health Affairs 10: 229-36.
Blendon, R.J. 1991. "Health Services Research: Implications for Policy, 
Management and Clinical Practice." Presidential Address to the Eighth An 
nual Meeting of the Association for Health Services Research, San Diego, 
CA, June.
Bodenheimer, T.S. 1989. "Payment Mechanisms and a National Health 
Program," Medical Care Review 46(1): 3-43.
Califano, J.A. 1989. "Billions Blown on Health," New York Times, April 11.
CBO (Congressional Budget Office). 1991. Selected Options for Expanding 
Health Insurance Coverage. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress.
Evans, R. 1988. Presentation at Summer Meeting of the Board of Trustees of 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, Harbor Springs, MI, July.
Evans, R. et al. 1989. "Controlling Health Expenditures: The Canadian 
Reality," New England Journal of Medicine 320: 571-77.
Fuchs, V.R. 1986. "Has Cost Containment Gone Too Far?" The Milbank 
Quarterly 64(3): 186-196.
GAO (U.S. General Accounting Office). 1991. Canadian Health Insurance: 
Lesson for the United States. GAO/HRD-91-90, June.
Goodman, J.C. and G.L. Musgrave. 1991. Twenty Myths About National 
Health Insurance. Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis, Policy 
Report No. 128.
Himmelstein, D.V. and S. Woolhandler. 1986. "Cost Without Benefit: Ad 
ministrative Waste in U.S. Health Care," New England Journal of Medicine 
314: 441-45.
Leibowitz, A., W.G. Manning, E.B. Keeler, et al. 1985. "The Effect of Cost 
Sharing on the Use of Medical Services by Children." Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand Corporation Report R-3287-HHS.
Levit, K.R. and C.A. Cowan. 1990. "The Burden of Health Care Costs: 
Business, Household, and Governments." Health Care Financing Review 
12(2): 127-137.
Long, S.H. and J. Rodgers. 1990. "The Effects of Being Uninsured on Health 
Care Service Use Estimates from the Survey of Income and Program Par 
ticipation." Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Working 
Paper No. 9012, Bureau of the Census.
Neuschler, E. 1990. Canadian Health Care: The Implications of Public Health 
Insurance. Washington, DC: Research Bulletin of the Health Insurance 
Association of America.
76 Coverage Through a Single Public Payer
Pepper Commission (U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health
Care). 1990. Final Report: A Call for Action. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Peterson, W.C. 1991. "The Silent Depression," Challenge 34(4): 29-34. 
Piacentini, J.S. and T.J. Cerino. 1990. EBRIData Book on Employee Benefits.
Washington, DC: Employee Benefit Research Institute. 
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz. 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 4: 629-650. 
Rublee, D.A. 1991. "Can We Develop an Equitable System in an Era of
Limited Health Care Resources." In The Future of Health Care: Public
Concerns and Policy Trends. Boston: Health Data Corporation. 
Scheiber, G.J. 1990. "Health Expenditures in Major Industrialized Countries,
1960-87, Health Care Financing Review 11(4): 159-167. 
U.S. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service. 1989. Statistics of
Income Bulletin, Publication 1136.
